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Abstract:
In this paper I first provide some empirical facts of international business cycles. I then investigate 
whether standard international real business cycle models can account for these moments of the data. 
I find that the standard theories seem unable to account for key-features of the data. For some variables 
(like consumption levels) theory predicts too high international comovements while it has the opposite 
implication for other variables (e.g. investment and output). Simple extensions do not improve the 
performance by much and stochastic shocks to government spending seem to have only minor effects 
in open-economy real business cycle models.
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In this paper I will argue that our understanding of the international transmission of business 
cycles may not very advanced. Standard quantitative open-economy models have implications 
for national business cycles and international comovements that are counterfactual and in some 
circumstances so much at odds with the data that one is led to conclude that these can not account 
for the transmission of macroeconomic fluctuations across countries. Since most economies 
depend heavily on their access to trade in international goods and financial markets, it seems 
important to try to gain further insight into this key element of modem economies.
The research into quantitative open economy models of business cycles has developed 
rapidly within recent years. This research has been concerned with understanding both 
individual-country aggregate fluctuations in open-economy frameworks and with features of 
international business cycles. Examples include analysis of national business cycles in 
small-open-economy models, see e.g. Macklem (1990), Mendoza (1991), Lundviik (1990), or 
Correia et al (1992), and in standard two-country open-economy models, see e.g. Backus, Kehoe 
and Kydland (1992a) (who study the U.S.) or Ravn (1992) (who study the U.K.). These models 
have also been used to study the behaviour of trade variables and relative prices, Backus (1993), 
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992b,c), the behaviour of savings and investment dynamics, 
Baxter and Crucini(1993) and Finn (1990), and international comovements, Bee (1992), Canova 
(1993), Devereux, Gregory and Smith (1992), Ravn (1991), and Stockman and Tesar (1990)1. 
Of particular interest to this paper, it has often been stressed in this literature (see e.g. Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland (1992a)) that an important (the central) puzzle of international business 
cycles is why the cross-country correlation of consumption levels is relatively small since 
standard Arrow-Debreu models of homogeneous agents would predict a near to perfect corre­
lation because of risk sharing properties. Other problematic implications of the models relative 
to the data have been dismissed as simply requiring minor changes in the parameter-settings; an 
example of this is the impeachment of the models’ predictions of low, or even negative, cross­
country output correlations.
I will argue that it is not the case that the only puzzle of international business cycles is 
the low cross-country correlation of consumption levels. Other counterfactual implications are 
also apparent. Two examples of this are the high correlation of output levels and the high 
correlation of investment levels across countries that show up in the data but which standard 
open-economy models of international business cycles can not account for unless unrealistic 
parameter values are used.
In the next section of this paper I present the basic "facts" that a model of international 
business cycles should address. In the data it is typically the case that national output levels are 
strongly positively correlated (with the exception of one out of ten countries), that national 
consumption levels are positively correlated (with the exception of two countries), that invest­
ment levels and exports and imports levels are positively correlated while no typical pattern is 
found for government spending. Net-exports ratios of output are typically negatively related to 
the U.S. figures but positively related to other countries net-exports levels. Furthermore, within 
countries, imports are strongly positively related to output, exports are positively (but less so 
than imports) correlated with output, while net exports move countercyclically. Finally, as is 
well-known, domestic savings and investment ratios are positively related.




























































































In section 3 of the paper I present two standard models of international business cycles. 
Since I will be concerned with, among other things, the behaviour of investment, both models 
will incorporate endogenous capital formation. The first model is a simple two-country extension 
of the single-country single-good real business cycle model. What this model highlights is 
countries’ ability to trade in international goods and financial markets and their dependence upon 
the world economy. The second model is a version of an international trade model in which each 
country is specialized in the production of a single good. This framework, used by Backus, Kehoe 
and Kydland (1992b,c), allows one to address questions that single-goods models leave unan­
swered (such as movements relative prices and imports and exports separately).
I find that the standard models have standard flaws: they can not account for important 
features of individual-country aggregate fluctuations and key elements of international business 
cycles. One potential problem that I try to address is that one normally assumes the two countries 
in the model-economies are symmetric and equally-sized. Since the sample of countries analyzed 
in section 2 of the paper by no means fulfil these requirements (at least not the second one) this 
presents a potential trap of the theoretical models which I try to avoid. The first alternative 
experiment involves changing the two-country model into two differenced-sized countries. 
Nevertheless, while this may be useful for aspects of individual country behaviour, it does not 
seem to be appropriate since we typically look at the relationship between individual countries, 
none of which denotes the "rest of the world". Accordingly, I augment the framework to a 
three-country model in which we look at the comovements of two countries both of which depend 
on each other as well as the world-economy.
The final experiments involve an analysis of the effects of government spendings on the 
counter-factual high cross-country correlations of consumption levels implied by the standard 
models. Government spending shocks have been shown to be a potentially important source to 
national business cycles (see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)) and could therefore also be 
important in an international framework. I find no major evidence in favour of government 
spending as a vehicle of limiting the cross-country correlation of consumption levels. Further­
more, government spending shocks have only small effects in an open-economy framework 
since they work through their effects on the real interest rate which is only partially determined 
by domestic variables. I do however, highlight a potentially interesting effect, worthwhile for 
future research, of government spending on trade dynamics.
The conclusion, contained in the final section of the paper, is that important characteristics 
of the data cannot easily be accounted for.
2 Some Facts of International Business Cycles
Since I will be concerned with the international transmission of business cycles, this section will 
be devoted to a look at the features of the data. I will restrict myself to look at countries for which 
quarterly data can be obtained for a reasonable long time period. In this paper the sample of 
countries is ten major OECD countries, the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Sweden for which I have data for time-periods 
going up to the second quarter of 1992 and starting at 19702. In order to avoid having to deal 
with very short run fluctuations and long term growth considerations, all data is deseasonalized
2For some countries I have data starting at earlier dates. Nevertheless, in order to make comparisons easier, I chose 




























































































and rendered stationary by applying a low frequency filter3. Altogether the sample of countries 
account for a major part of aggregate OECD output (around 90 percent) and the countries are 
sufficiently heterogeneous to provide information for making quite general statements.
Our first investigation is related to the international comovements of output components 
or the "international business cycle". The results of this investigation are reported in table 1. 
Data for output components are probably some of the most readily comparable across countries 
because of coordinated international standards for national accounting. Previous research (see 
e.g. Blackburn and Ravn (1991) or Danthine and Donaldson (1993)) have highlighted two basic 
facts. First, that national output levels are highly correlated across countries, and second that 
also consumption levels are positively correlated but to a smaller degree than output levels. The 
positive cross-country comovements of output levels is supported by the numbers in part A of 
table 1 with the exception of Sweden (for Sweden all correlations except that with France are 
positive but insignificantly different from zero). The second statement, that consumption levels 
are positively correlated, is also supported but to a smaller degree since both Sweden and 
Australia, for none of which there is any general applicable rule, are exceptions. Finally, the 
third element of the traditional wisdom, that output correlations are greater than consumption 
correlations, can be checked informally by investigating whether the consumption correlation 
is below the corresponding consumption correlation subtracted two standard errors of the output 
correlation and vice versa. It turns out that in 20 out of 45 cases the consumption correlation is 
smaller than the corresponding output correlation less two standard errors of the point estimate 
while in three cases (Sweden-France, U.K.-Japan and U.K.-Switzerland) the output correlation 
is smaller than the consumption correlation subtracted two standard errors. This leaves 22 cases 
indecisive but only three of these have a greater point estimate of the consumption correlation 
than the corresponding country-pair output correlation. The general impression is that even 
though the evidence is mixed, output levels are typically stronger related across countries than 
consumption levels.
The remaining parts of table 1 relate to the cross-country correlation of other output 
components, correlations that so far has been almost neglected in the literature. Panel 3 reports 
the results for government spending levels. If these were strongly correlated across countries, 
government spending could constitute an important source of cross-country comovements. This 
is not the case, however. Eight of the 45 correlations are significantly positive (the largest of 
which is 0.46 and relate to Germany-U.S.), three significantly negative (Canada-Italy is the most 
significant with a point estimate of -0.359) while the rest are insignificantly different from zero. 
This indicates that a theory building on international comovements being related to international 
coordination of government spending could be troublesome. This, of course does not mean that 
government spending by itself can not be a major determinant of international business cycles.
Panels 4-6 report the cross-country correlations of total investment levels and of the 
sub-components, fixed investment and inventory investment. These panels contains valuable 
information since they reveal that cross-country comovements of investments are substantial 
and (with the exception of Sweden) positive. In fact, the cross-country relation between 
investment levels are in many cases as strong, or stronger, than that between output levels. It 
should be stressed that while this is true for fixed investment and total investment it does not 
hold for inventory investment that show no typical relation across countries4. Nevertheless, there 
seems to be an important cross-country connection in these series. Explaining this fact will be 
important in the next section.
3In the tables 1 present results from Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filtered data. I have, however, also computed statistics 
from use of other low frequency fdters (first differences and linear trends) which is available upon request. While 
specific numbers depend quantitatively upon the fdter used, most qualitative results remain unchanged.
"A note of caution should be mentioned at this point since the figures for inventory investment relate to filtered 





























































































Finally, panels 7-9 contain the cross-country correlations of exports, imports and the 
net-exports output ratio. These highlight another important result, namely that exports and 
imports levels are positively correlated across countries. Furthermore, except for Germany, the 
contemporaneous correlation of net-exports ratios with the U.S. are negative while 17 out of the 
remaining 36 numbers are significantly positive and only 4 significantly negative. With respect 
to net-exports, the United States appears to be an exception that possibly could be important.
Next, we will explore the relation between output and its’ sub-components within the ten 
countries. Estimates of the variability and contemporaneous correlations are given in table 2. Of 
most interest to my purpose are those relating to the trade variables. As noted by other researchers 
(see the references above), these relationships have a high degree of cross-country conformity. 
In particular, imports are strongly positively (and significantly so for all countries) related to 
output and much more variable than output. Exports are also significantly positively correlated 
with output (with the exceptions of Australia and Japan) but, with the exception of Sweden, the 
contemporaneous relationship between imports and output is much stronger than that between 
exports and output. Furthermore, exports are more volatile than output but, aside from Germany, 
less variable than imports. The variability of the net-exports ratio of output is typically with a 
range of 0.75 to 1.1. The exceptions to this rule are the U.S., which have very smooth net-exports, 
and Sweden and Australia in which this ratio is around 1.5. Finally, with the exceptions of Sweden 
and Germany, net-exports are significantly negatively correlated with output and for some 
countries quite strongly so (especially in France, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland).
Table 2 also gives information about the much-discussed positive correlation between 
savings and investment rates first documented by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) in a cross-section 
framework, and later also found in time-series by e.g. Obstfeld (1986). It is well recognized that 
savings are difficult to measure and accordingly I will use the "basic savings "measure of Obstfeld 
(1986) given by output less private and government consumption. In the current sample, most 
correlations between domestic savings and investment ratios of output are positive, again with 
the exception of Sweden. Nevertheless, the evidence is not too strong since the correlation is 
significantly different from zero only in France, Australia, Switzerland and the U.S. with the 
U.S. figure being by far the largest. Accordingly, even though investment and savings ratios do 
seem positively related the data is not very convincing.
Concerning the other output components, the table more or less underlines the traditional 
wisdom. Consumption is smoother than output (not in Japan, the U.K. and Sweden, though) and 
substantially procyclical (Sweden excepted), fixed investment and total investment more volatile 
than output and with high contemporaneous correlations with output. Finally, the inven­
tory-investment ratio of output is procyclical but with some variation in its’ volatility across 
countries.
3 Two Prototype Models
In this section I set up two standard models of international business cycles. Both of these will 
incorporate capital formation in order to facilitate the analysis of investment dynamics. It would 
be easy to generate international comovements in line with the data if parameters could be chosen 
freely and if one disregarded the moments of national business cycles. In order not to bias the 
results, I will focus on both national and international implications of the models and I will 
parameterize computable versions of the theories.




























































































The first model is a standard two-country extension of a single-good closed-economy real 
business cycle model. The two countries will be identified by the index i which can take on two 
values, 1 and 2. Each country is represented by a single consumer/producer who is a stand-in 
for a "large" number of identical infinitely-lived individuals. Furthermore, the economies are 
assumed to be perfectly competitive but possibly distorted. In addition to consumers/producers, 
each country is endowed with a government. The preferences of the representative agent in 
country i is given by the expected utility function of the form:
U, - E 0 2  p‘u j P M
r - 0
(i)
where U is total discounted lifetime utility, E is the conditional expectations operator, p the 
subjective discount factor, u is the momentary utility function, D some measure of consumption 
and L is time devoted to leisure. Momentary preferences are given by the homothetic function
1 - a )
where o  is the rate of relative risk aversion.
Agents are constrained by the amount of time available each period and the number of 
hours they work cannot be enjoyed as sparetime. They therefore face the time constraint
T ~Lh +Nu
where N is the number of hours devoted to market activities (work). In the following we will 
normalize total time to one. The single output good is produced with linearly homogeneous 
Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y t - Z & V I M 1-* (2)
Here Y is the amount of output goods produced, Z is a stationary, possibly random, 
technology shock, K is the stock of capital, N is number of hours worked, H the rate of labour 
augmenting (Harrod-neutral) technological progress, and 1 -  a  is the labour-share of total 
income. The Harrod-neutral technological progress process is supposed to grow at the exogenous 
constant rate y - 1  which will be assumed to equal across countries. Capital accumulates 
according to:
+ (3)
where x is the investment level and <(>(.) is a function that is meant to capture capital-adjustment 
costs. Adjustment costs are incorporated here in order not too generate "wild" behaviour of 
investment. It is a basic feature of open-economy real business cycle models that, if investment 
can flow freely and frictionless across countries, the variability of investment becomes enormous. 
One way of avoiding this problem is to introduce adjustment costs. If the ^-function is linearly 
homogeneous we have the standard friction-less capital accumulation equation. Furthermore, 
we will assume this function is weakly concave and non-negative, 4> a 0, <|>’ a  0, <J>” a  0. Further 




























































































The government is supposed to spend an exogenous flow of government spending, G, to 
tax income at a proportional rate, x, and to levy (or redistribute) lump-sum taxes T. Since, in 
case of a non-zero proportional tax, taxes are distortionary we have to make some assumptions 
at this stage in order to solve for the competitive equilibrium. Accordingly, we will assume that 
individuals take all government variables as exogenous which is consistent with the existence 
of a "large" number of individuals. This means that we can solve for the competitive equilibrium 
along the lines in King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988b) by first solving for the individual problem 
and then imposing the government budget constraint which is given by5:
To allow for balanced growth, we will assume that government spending, G, and transfers, 
T, grow along with H. Notice the assumption that the government balances its budget on a 
period-by-period basis; it would, of course, be trivial to allow for non-zero government debt.
In many studies government spending is taken to be "down-the-drain" expenditure, i.e. 
spending that yields no benefits. A more general assumption, and hopefully more realistic as 
well, is that agents derive at least some utility from government expenditure. One way to model 
this, used by e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992), is to assume that government spending enters into the agents utility function in the form 
of affecting the marginal utility of private consumption:
where C is private consumption and the parameter p determines how much government spending 
affects private marginal utility. If p is zero (one) government spending does not affect marginal 
utility of private consumption directly (affects private marginal utility on a one-to-one basis).
The two countries face the aggregate resource constraint given by:
In equilibrium no resources will be wasted so we can replace the in-equality by an equality.
At this point it will be useful to convert everything into a non-growing stationary repre­
sentation. This can be done by dividing all variables by the Harrod-neutral technological progress 
variable H. Since the functional forms allow for balanced growth, all output components and 
the capital stock will be growing at the common rate y - 1  (see King, Plosser and Rebelo (1987)). 
Furthermore, hours worked (and leisure) will not be growing. Letting "detrended" variables be 
represented by lower-case letters, the model in its’ stationary representation is identical to the 
one above with two changes:
(4)
Du -  C„ + pG„
(Cj, + Xu + G j,) + (C\, +Xa + Ga) s  Ylt + Y1: (5)
U , - E 0 2  (P*)'[(c,., + pg„)e(l -A y <1“6)]1"<7( l - a )t-0
= (1 -  6 )k„ + <|>(x jk u)ku
(1’)
(3’)
5 In this constraint I have not distinguished between individual and economy-wide variables since this is trivial. 




























































































where p* is given by pY*1' 01.
In our first experiments we will consider the simplest version of this model in which the 
government levies a constant proportional tax rate and finances any differences between spending 
and tax-revenue by lump-sum taxes. In this model the properties of the competitive equilibrium 
can be analyzed by solving the model as a pseudo planning problem. First, individuals are 
supposed to take government actions as given which is consistent with the assumption of a "large" 
number of individuals. This basically involves ignoring the government budget constraint. After 
this the planner incurs the government budget constraint so as to make the individual behaviour 
consistent with aggregate constraints. Furthermore, since we are dealing with more than one 
representative agent (one in each country) the planner will associate each with a weight, denoted 
by II. For each set of weights (nis n2) there is an associated competitive equilibrium for a given 
distribution of initial wealth.
For future reference we can consider how to introduce country-size into the model. If we 
assume that countries are equally wealthy on a per-capita basis but differ in terms of the number 
(measure) of agents, the appropriate way of including country-sizes is to change the aggregate 
resource constraint to:
nj(Cx, +XU + G„) + ly e *  +X^ + Gj,) -  ITj/j, + ITjKj, (5’)
In this formulation one unit of country i consumption, investment or government spending 
(at the per-capita level) takes up II, units of world output and one unit of country i output adds 
II, units to world output. Relative country sizes are then simply given by the ratio IIj/II2.
It is well-known that no closed-form solutions exist for this model and accordingly one 
needs to approximate the model in some way to investigate the properties of the equilibrium. 
There are many ways of doing this (see the special issue of Journal of Business and Economics 
Statistics for an presentation of various methods). Here I will follow King, Plosser and Rebelo 
(1988a) by linearizing the first-order conditions around the steady state6. In order to do so, I will 
assume that the two countries are symmetric, i.e. that their "deep" parameters are identical. 
Assuming this, deriving the first-order conditions, linearizing around the steady state and making 
the appropriate substitutions yields a set of equations in the percentage deviation from steady 
state7 which followingly can be used for quantitative investigations.
In order to simulate the model we need to derive the steady state and parameterize the 
following v a r i a b l e s a n d  st which denote the labour and capital shares of output, sD which is 
the gross consumption share of output given by sum of the share of private consumption and p 
times the share of government spending, sg and sx that are the output-shares of government 
spending and investment. We also need values of ̂  and (5fc and §„) which are the elasticities
of marginal utility of consumption (leisure) with respect to consumption and leisure, and for 
and ijfcv (1™, and %m ) which denote the elasticities of the marginal product of capital (labour) 
with respect to capital and labour. Finally, we need a value for ^ 8, the elasticity of the capital 
adjustment costs with respect to the investment-capital ratio.
61 have also solved all models by using matrix Ricatti iteration techniques. The resulting moments are almost
identical to those using the technique reported in the paper.
’These equations are given in an appendix available upon request 




























































































3.1.1 Calibration o f the Single-Good Model
The parameterization, as in other real business cycle models, can briefly be described as 
choosing share parameters such that the model replicates mean ratios of the data, and set curvature 
parameters using results of existing empirical studies. When none of these options are available 
one either needs to perform a statistical study or to make sensitivity analysis.
Out first set of parameters concern parameters of preferences and labour supply. The 
number N  is the steady state ratio of total time devoted to market activities. This ratio is in Baxter 
and Crucini (1993), along with King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988), set to 20 percent (which is 50% 
lower than the corresponding number in e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982)); I will use this value, 
even though it seems to be low. Given this number and the parameter values of government 
shares of output and the production technology, the parameter 0 (and therefore the elasticities 
of marginal utilities) has to be chosen so that
0 -  (sc/(l -%)ss )(N /l -AT)/(1 + (sD/ ( l -x )s„ )(N /l-N )). In the balanced growth steady-state 
equilibrium the subjective rate of discount will be determined by the real rate of interest via the 
relation p -  1/1 + r which in turn together with the mean growth rate, y, and the preference 
parameters, 0 and a, gives (5*. The first of these parameters, the real rate of interest, is normally 
set to around 6.5% annually, a value that I will use here. The relative rate of risk aversion, o, is 
more controversial. Standard values in the literature are 1 (logarithmic utility) or 2 .1 will use 
the more risk averse case of these, setting it equal to 2. Finally, we need a value for the effect of 
government spending on private marginal utility, p. The range of plausible values of this para­
meter is the unit interval. A value of one implies that government spending have no effects 
whatsoever. In the literature standard parameter values that have been used are 0 and 0.5.1 will 
use the former of these but later make some further analysis of the importance of this parameter.
The second set of parameters is related to the production technology and to capital for­
mation. Given the constant returns production function and competitive markets, the parameter
1 -  a  is equal to the mean labour share of income. Standard values of this parameter are 58% 
(King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988)) and 64% (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992a)). To make 
the study comparable to Baxter and Crucini (1993), I will use the former of these values.
Concerning the technology for accumulating capital we need to choose values for three 
parameters. The first of these is the rate of depreciation. A commonly used, and uncontroversial, 
value for this 2.5% per quarter. This implies a mean life-time of new capital of 10 years. Next 
we will assume, as in Baxter and Crucini (1993), that our model in steady state is identical to 
one with no adjustment costs. This implies that §{x/k) is equal to xlk9 which from (3’) follows 
as y -  (1 -  6). Furthermore, we will assume that Tobin’s Q, which is given by 1/(|>’, is equal to 
one in steady state so that the price of new capital equals that of ready-installed capital. Finally, 
we need to make a choice of the value for the elasticity of the adjustment costs, The value of 
this parameter is more difficult to pin down. Baxter and Crucini (1993) use two different values,
0.075 ("small" adjustment costs) and 0.150 ("big" adjustment costs). I will experiment with the 
smaller of these values but later argue that even this value is probably too high. Given these 
parameter values, the capital-output ratio is endogenously given from the first order condition 
for new capital evaluated at steady state. In particular, it follows that the capital-output ratio is 
given by p*(l - t)V(Y -  (5*0 -  5)).
’ Note that the adjustment costs assumptions in Baxter and Crucini (1993) strictly speaking are inconsistent This 
is because they assume that <J> is a strictly ppositive, strictly increasing, concave function. These assumptions are 
inconsistent with <J) being equal to i/k at steady state. Furthermore, the strict positiveness of <{> implies that new 
capital is added even with zero investment. To avoid these problems I have assumed that § is non-negative, 




























































































The next set of parameters concerns the mean shares of output components. The output 
share of consumption across countries in the sample is relatively constant around 60% with a 
maximum of 64% in the U.S. and a minimum of 52% in Sweden'°(see table 3). The mean shares 
of government expenditures and investment are more diverse across countries. The shares of 
government spending (investment) ranges from a low 10 percent (high 31 percent) in Japan to 
a high 28 percent (low 21 percent) in Sweden. Most countries are, however, relatively close to 
20 percent for each components. The problem is, however, that given the share of government 
expenditure, the shares of consumption and investment are endogenously given by the relation 
between the investment share and the capital-output ratio. I choose to set the government share 
equal to 20%, the investment share equal to its implied value, and the consumption share is then 
given by the residual of these. The constant proportional income-tax rate is set to 30% so that 
at steady-state the government transfers are 10% of output.
The final set of parameters that we need to address are those related to the stochastic shocks 
of the model. There are two sources of impulses in this model, technology shocks and government 
spending shocks10 1. These two sets of variables will be assumed to be generated by bivariate 
autoregressions:
where Z, -  [Zu Z j ’ and g, -  [gu g j ’ and ez and wheree^ will be assumed to be serially 
independent normally-distributed shocks with variance-covariance matrices Qz and £2r  The 
A-matrices determine the persistence and cross-country spill-overs of technology shocks and 
government spending shocks while Q determines the variability and contemporaneous corre­
lation of the innovations to these processes.
Since government spending levels, as discussed in section 2, seem largely unrelated across 
countries, the matrices Ag and will be taken to be diagonal with elements ag and c^. The 
persistence parameter will be assumed to 0.95 while the standard deviation will be taken to be 
0.004 (2% of governments mean-share of output). We will perform some sensitivity analysis 
later.
The process for technology shocks are somewhat complicated to deal with since technology 
shocks are, after all, unobserved. One way to obtain a measure of these shocks is to derive Solow 
residuals and then estimate a bivariate vector autoregression of the form specified in (6.1). 
Nevertheless, such a task is complicated by two problems of measurement. The first problem is 
associated with obtaining capital stock measures for an array of countries and furthermore it is 
well-recognized that capital stock figures belong to some of the more unreliable macroeconomic 
time series. A way of avoiding this problem is to derive series for Solow residuals by assuming 
that capital stocks are approximately constant over the business cycle. The second problem 
connects to the measurement of the labour input. A "perfect" measure of the labour input would 
be quality-adjusted hours-worked series but it is not possible to obtain such series. One may, 
however, argue that due to the similarities of the set of countries in the sample, neglecting the 
quality-adjustment presents only a minor problem. Obtaining comparable series of hours-worked 
is, moreover, also a problem since the measurement of hours-per-worker deviates across 
countries.
10 Sweden is however an outlier in that perspective, the next lowest is Germany with a share of 56%.
11 One might also wish to model tax-rates as stochastic, a case which is analyzed by e.g. Chang (1992) and Greenwood 
and Huffman (1991). I will ignore this source of stochastic shocks.
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Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992a) assume that most of the variation in the Solow 
residuals come from the number of employed workers and accordingly they estimate Solow 
residuals from the relation Inz, = In y, - a ln £ ,  where E is the number of employed persons. They 
obtain the following estimates for the two-country technology-shock process from a vec­
tor-autoregression on the U.S.andan European aggregate: = 0.906, a-j. = 0.088, a= -  0.00852,
and cor(z,z’) = 0.258 where a= denote the diagonal elements ofA_„ aa . the off-diagonal elements 
of the same matrix, a„  the standard deviation of the innovations to the technology shocks and 
cor(z,z’) the contemporaneous correlation of these innovations12.
I have estimated Solow residuals for nine of the ten countries in the current sample by 
performing an experiment essentially identical to that of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992a). 
Sweden was excluded from the sample since no reliable employment data is provided13. Sample 
periods were coordinated to cover the period 1970.1-1992.1 to facilitate cross-country com­
parisons. Table 4 gives the results of this analysis when all countries are included in bivariate 
vector-autoregressions with the U.S14. Notice that the variance of the innovation to the U.S. series 
is very similar in the eight estimations and very close to 0.0082, an estimate practically identical 
to that of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992a). The standard deviations of the innovation to the 
other countries’ processes (in the VAR’s) do, however, differ substantially. Nevertheless, it is 
still the case that the average standard deviation in all cases is close to 0.008. The contempor­
aneous correlation coefficient (between the innovations to the processes) is in all cases pretty 
near to 0.25 (the extremes are Germany-U.S. with a correlation of only 0.038 and Canada-U.S. 
where it is 0.354).
More differences are apparent in the estimates of the Az matrices. In particular, the spill­
overs in technology differ a lot in both signs and magnitudes. There are four cases in which an 
innovation in one country has a negative effect upon the other country though only in one case 
is this effect significant (this case relates to the U.S. and Italy). Negative spill-overs present a 
conceptual problem since one normally would not expect a positive technology shock in one 
country to make the technology in other countries less effective. The negative coefficients 
probably reflect problems associated with measurement or the more fundamental problem that 
Solow residuals may mirror other underlying shocks. Nevertheless, the general impression from 
the estimates is that the spill-overs are moderate and only in the case of the U.S. and U.K. are 
they substantial and positive.
After symmetrizing the original matrices, A., into matrices that have identical diagonal elements 
and off-diagonal elements that are identical up to a sign difference, the persistence parameter is 
quite stable with a mean of 0.835 over the eight estimates. The spill-overs still differ but are in 
most cases close to 0 (the average is 0.024).
Baxter and Crucini (1993) argue that the Solow residual series are too unreliable and 
therefore experiment with three different ad-hoc alternatives. These three cases are 1) aa = 0.8, 
a„. = 0.15, and cor(z,z’) = 0.5, 2) a,z = 0.9, a„. = 0.05, and cor(z,z’) -  0.0, and 3) aa -  0.9,
12 These parameter estimates are symmetric versions of the original least squares results.
“ The differences between my estimates and those of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) may be due to the following 
factors. First, I linearly detrend the series in order to avoid some statistical problems. Second the sample periods 
differ. Third, we use slightly different series.




























































































a„. -  0.05, and cor(z,z’) -  0.2. The first of these imply very big spill-overs indeed; in fact any 
difference due to an innovation to technology in one country disappears almost (becomes smaller 
than 5%) within less than 2 years while this takes more than 7 years in cases 2 and 31 *5.
Since there apparently is a great deal of uncertainty associated with the processes describing 
technologies, I will experiment with three cases. The first (process A) relate to my own estimates 
taking the persistence to be 0.835, the spill-over zero and the residual correlation to be 0.25. The 
next (process B) is the estimates of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992a). The final experiment 
(process C) relates to the first alternative of Baxter and Crucini (1993) implying big spill-overs. 
It is important to note how different these three processes are even though they all seem to 
represent reasonable parameterizations (the Baxter and Crucini case the least so though). Figure 
1 shows the dynamic evolution of productivity following an innovation to country 1 productivity 
(taking the innovation-correlation into account). For the A-process the productivity shocks are 
very temporary and productivity levels across countries are almost unrelated. Using the B-process 
leads to a very long period of high productivity and it takes a long time for foreign productivity 
to catch up with the domestic level. In contrast to this, the B-process implies a fast catch-up but 
less (more) persistence in productivity than in case B (A). The effects of these differences will 
be evident in the experiments that follow.
3.1.2 Quantitative Analysis o f the Single-Good Model
Given the parameter values discussed above, I now move on to a quantitative evaluation of the 
model. This will be done by simulating the model for a given set of parameter values. The results 
of the simulations refer to the average of simulations of the model with a length 100 quarters 
replicated 100 times. The results are reported in table 616. Numbers in parentheses are the standard 
deviations of the moments over these experiments17.
The results of our first experiments are given in rows A-C (where A-C refer to the tech­
nology processes discussed above). It is noticeable that the models do almost equally well in 
explaining the correlations between domestic output and consumption and investment levels and 
in explaining the persistence of output.
For other moments of the model the implications do, however, differ. First, model A which 
have the smallest root in the technology shock process predicts very low variability of con­
sumption and higher variability of investment that the other parameterizations. The reason for 
this is the usual, that when shocks are less persistent, investment become more sensitive since 
agents take advantage of the temporary high productivity whereas consumption becomes 
smoother because of the usual permanent income considerations. Secondly, the cross-country 
correlations of output and investment differ markedly across experiments. The reason for this is 
that these moments are very dependent upon the technology shock processes. Figure 2 illustrates 
the impulse response functions following an innovation to country 1 technology (again taking 
the contemporaneous innovation-correlation into account). The spillovers employed in case C 
are so big that any difference in output and, in particular, in investment levels disappear within
11 If one computes bivariate vector-autoregression of the form (13.1) for all combinations of countries in my sample,
one only finds two cases with spill-overs that are in the range of case 1). These two cases relate to U.K.-U.S. and
Australia-Canada. Both of these cases do, however have lower persistence parameters than that of the example in
Baxter and Crucini.
16 All simulations were carried out in Gauss 2.2 VM and to make the moments comparable across experiments the
random number generator was seeded at 7654321 in all experiments. Computer programmes are available from the 
author upon request.
17 A more useful statistic may be the standard error of the moments. This number is given by the standard deviation 





























































































a time-horizon of two years. For case B, the immediate difference in productivity is bigger which 
leads to oppositely directed immediate responses in investment and output as capital flows to 
country 1. After only a few periods, however, investment and output increases abroad as tech­
nology spills over. These effects explain the negative contemporaneous (positive) contempor­
aneous correlations of output and investment in case B (C). In case A the explanation is slightly 
different. Here the only spill-over is due to the contemporaneous correlation of the technology 
shocks. Furthermore, as discussed above, the shocks are less persistent and the impulses of output 
and investment are therefore more rapid and disappears faster. As is clear from table 6 and figure 
1, domestic and foreign output are largely uncorrelated while investment levels are positively 
correlated. What one would expect was that investment levels were negatively correlated since 
there the spill-overs in technology are very small. This intuition is somewhat wrong, however. 
What happens is that hours-worked abroad decreases since the output good is more efficiently 
produced abroad. There is also a tendency for investment to be directed to country 1 but this is 
limited by the adjustment-costs and by the minor increase in foreign productivity. The decrease 
in foreign hours worked is therefore made-up for by an increase in the foreign capital stock 
through higher investment but all-in-all foreign output is left almost unchanged. This illustrates 
that the international comovements are very dependent upon the exact parameterization of the 
technology shock process.
The international relation between consumption levels is much less dependent upon the 
technology shock process. When government spending does not affect private marginal utility 
directly, the only mechanism that bounds this correlation away from one is the intratemporal 
substitution between consumption and leisure and apparently this effect is not strong enough to 
limit risk sharing by much.
Comparing the models’ moments with those of the data we see that the correlations of 
domestic consumption and investment with domestic output are relatively close to those in the 
data. The same is true for the absolute variability and persistence of output. Second, we notice 
that the models somewhat overestimate the domestic savings-investment correlations since 
experiments A-B imply larger correlations than in any of the ten countries while the correlation 
in case C is slightly lower than that of the U.S. but higher than any of the other countries’ 
savings-investment correlations.
In most other respects the models seem further away from the data. First, the relative 
variability of consumption and investment, and the variability of the net-exports output ratio’s 
are underestimated. This is true for consumption independent of the country we look at, for 
investment with the exceptions of Italy and Sweden while the variability of the net-exports ratios 
is close only to the U.S. figure which is around 50% lower than in any other country. Second, 
while net-exports are countercyclical in all countries, all experiments imply procyclical 
net-exports. Third models A and B predict negative comovements in output an implication which 
is at odds with the data. With respect to investment levels, that are positively correlated in the 
data, experiments A and C do have this implication while B predicts negative or insignificant 
cross-country correlations. Fourthly, all experiments have very high cross-country correlations 
(larger than 0.9) of consumption levels. Finally, all models imply very counterfactually that the 
net-exports ratios of output are almost perfectly negatively correlated across countries.
On this background it does not seem unfair to conclude that these models cannot account 
for the international business cycle. The models seem in most respects to be very much at odds 
with the data. Furthermore, only case C had the implication of positive cross country comove­
ments of both output and investment, as in the data. Do, however, recall that this model implies 




























































































Before moving on to some alternative experiments it is worth considering a point in 
connection to the above analysis. Recall that we included capital-adjustment costs on the basis 
of limiting the variability of investment but also that it was hard to find any evidence on the 
elasticity of these costs. The adjustment-cost elasticity in the above experiments was the one 
named "small" in Baxter and Crucini (1993), but rather surprisingly the models under-estimate 
the variability of investment relative to the data. An alternative procedure would therefore be to 
choose the adjustment-cost parameter such that it implies a variability of investment in the range 
of what is observed in the data. In the data, the investment variability depends very much upon 
which measure of investment we are using; while the mean over the ten countries for the ratio 
standard deviations of fixed investment to the standard deviation of output is 2.9 the corre­
sponding statistic for total investment is 4.5. Since all investment in the theoretical model relates 
to fixed investments we may want to use the former of these figures. Furthermore, it is noticeable 
that the variability of investment in Italy is very much lower than that in any other country and 
by excluding Italy the mean ratio of variability of fixed investment to output is raised to 2.97.
The columns numbered A l-D l of table 4 contain the moments of the model, with the four 
cases of technology shock processes listed above, when the adjustment-cost parameter is 
decreased so that the implied variability of investment to output is near 318. It is evident that 
adjustment-costs have important effects upon the moments of the model. By nature, its’ most 
important function is to limit the investment variability but this affects other relationships. For 
the present analysis, a significant observation is that a lower ^  reduces the cross-country 
comovements of investment levels and most substantially so for case C where the correlation is 
reduced from 0.9 to 0.37. This effect is explained by the fact that capital now flows more rapidly 
to the more productive economy. As a result of this, the correlations between output and 
net-exports fall but still remain positive. The other counter-factual implications of the models 
remain as in the previous experiments.
Our final experiment with the standard models is a check upon a suggestion in Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland (1992a) who state that the low cross-country comovements of the interna­
tional real business cycle models can be overturned by a slight change in the parameters of the 
model. Their example is almost identical to that of case A in that they introduce a closer link 
between technology across countries. In particular they assume that au = 0.79, a=. = 0.20, and 
cor(z,z’) -  0.5. This parameterization implies quite extreme spill-overs - any productivity dif­
ference due to an innovation to technology disappears (is smaller than 5%) with 1-2 years and 
this is probably highly unrealistic. The results of this parameter configuration are listed in columns 
D and D1 with D corresponding to a value for ^  of 0.075 and D1 with this elasticity chosen so 
that the implied ratio standard deviation of investment to the standard deviation of output is 
three. It is noted that most moments resemble that of experiment C with the following differences. 
First, cross-country output levels are only slightly positively correlated. Second, the variability 
of investment is very small. The savings-investment correlation on the other hand is insignifi­
cantly different from zero. When the elasticity of adjustment-costs is modified, the positive 
correlation across countries of investment levels disappear and the positive correlation of output 
levels is significantly reduced (but the savings-investment correlation is raised to a value close 
to that of the other experiments). Furthermore, the model suffers from the same flaws as the 
other cases since net-exports are procyclical and quite smooth, consumption levels almost per­
fectly correlated across countries, and net-exports levels de-facto perfectly negatively correlated.
Summing up, the experiment with the standard single-good two-country model have 
illustrated that it can not account for key-features of the data.




























































































3.2 A Multiple Goods Model
We will now set up a two-country model in which each country specializes in the production of 
a single differentiated good. This will allow us, among other things, to make a distinction between 
exports and imports separately as well as look into relative price movements19. The existence of 
several goods presents a potential problem insofar that we have to make some assumptions about 
how these goods are converted into a similar standard. One set of assumption would be that 
countries trade only in consumption goods and that only with-in country goods are useful for 
capital formation20. Such assumptions are, however, not very useful in the sense that they exclude 
trade in investment that by some authors have been claimed to be the main determinant of trade 
balance movements (see Stockman and Svensson (1987)). An alternative formulation is to include 
a technology that converts the output good into a final good. Such an approach is taken by Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland (1992b,c) who make use of the Armington aggregator (Armington (1969)) 
as such a tool. I will follow this approach.
The model is identical to the single-good model with the following changes. Each country 
produces an output good, Y„ that can be used at home or exported:
where A„ and Bu are the amount of country 1 and 2 output goods that are used in country i. The 
production functions continue to be given by (2). Using the output goods, a final good is produced 
in either country. The function that converts output-goods into final-goods is assumed to be a 
homogeneous CES function with an elasticity of substitution given by 1/p:
where (col,co2) determines the import share (or, alternatively, preference for homegoods). The 
two economies are subject to the following resource constraints:
The remaining parts of the model are unchanged with the following exception that we 
exclude capital-adjustment costs. These were included only to avoid enormous variability of 
investment in the single-good economy. The present model does not suffer under this problem 
unless the Armington aggregator is linearly homogeneous. Accordingly, we reformulate the 
capital accumulation into the standard neoclassical case of:





K ,t l -a ~ ò )K ,+ X , (10)
19 The relative price in the model of the previous section is, of course, by definition always 1.




























































































One may, of course, also wish to include adjustment costs in the present model but this is 
neglected here. This model can, as the previous one, be converted into a non-growing repre­
sentation by dividing by H, and, as above, all final goods and output goods will grow along with 
the Harrod-neutral technological progress.
We can measure the equilibrium terms of trade, the relative price of imports to exports, 
as:
and domestic imports and exports in terms of the domestic final good as:
mqf -  fl2l 
imu — p ltbu
Finally, the net-exports ratio of output will be given by:
«*n -  («2. - P iM /y u
Here we will neglect country size and analyze a symmetric version of the model in which 
n , is set equal to 1/221. We can then approximate the model’s behaviour near steady-state as 
above. Before doing so, I will make a few normalizations. First, assume that the two economies 
to be symmetric, so that, in steady state, ai = b2 and a2 -  b2. From this it is easy to show the 
following relations:
Next, denote the import share of output by M„ i.e. ay -  (1 -M t)yl and i>s -  M ,ylt which 
then implies that (1 -M J/M , -  (cOj/a)2)(1/p). Next we will make the normalization that, in steady 
state, the output of final goods equal the output of good y. This normalization seems reasonable 
in light of the symmetry assumptions. This implies that:
This model needs the calibration of only two additional variables, the steady state import 
share, Ms, and the elasticity of substitution p. The import share can be calibrated to match the 
long-run average in the data. The problem with this is that the import (and export) shares of 
output vary a lot across countries from a high 38.6% in Switzerland to only 7.7% in the U.S.
21 If one wish to include country size, (14.1) and (14.2) should be altered into y„ -y t,,+  (n2/TI1)A2, and 
Yy m By+(iyry#*.
dv/dbu lOjbjT3 
P" ~ dv/dau “  cojfliT 
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The average across countries is around 22.5% with six countries being relatively close to this 
number. Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992b) experiment with shares of 15% (normal import- 
share) and 30% (big share). Here I will assume the steady state share to be 22.5%, which 
economically, as well as quantitatively, is not very different from 15%, but some sensitivity 
analysis will follow. The benchmark value of the elasticity of substitution will be set equal to
1.5 which corresponds to the value used by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992b,c). Part II of 
table 6 reports the results from simulations of this model. The three first columns, A-C, differ 
in the technology shock processes and relate to the same cases as in the previous section. Since 
we now have separate information on imports and exports, moments of these variables are 
included in the table.
It is noticeable that the model does well in replicating moments of the data that the 
single-good model could not account for (and it does this in all three cases). In particular, 
net-exports are now counter-cyclical and this arises - just as in the data - because imports are 
more procyclical than exports. The pro-cyclicality of imports is, however, very pronounced 
(above 0.95 in all cases) and higher than observed in the data. This procyclicality is caused by 
the substitution between inputs in the Armington aggregator; even though a domestic shock 
increases the share of domestic inputs in the Armington aggregator (since these goods become 
relatively cheaper) the substitution between goods amounts to an increase in imports. Further­
more, the increase in imports combined with the increase in the terms of trade make net-exports 
deteriorate in spite of increased exports. Over time, the trade balance recovers and the initial 
deficit is changed into a surplus.
Thirdly, relative to the single-good model, the output correlation is increased though only 
substantially positive in the "big" spill-over case. Fourth, cases A and C both imply positive 
comovements of exports levels across countries (as is the case in the data) while only the latter 
of these contains a sizable positive correlation of imports levels. Notice also that the present 
model does not imply very big variability of investments though the point estimates are in the 
higher end of the range observed in the data.
Nevertheless, the model still suffers under problems similar to the single-good model. 
First, the consumption levels are generally smoother than we see in the data. Second the 
net-exports variability resembles only that of the U.S. Furthermore, and maybe more seriously, 
investment levels are contemporanously negatively correlated across countries (but for reasons 
that are more subtle than in the single good model22) and net-exports levels, just as in the previous 
case, are almost perfectly negatively correlated. Finally, while exports and imports in the data 
typically have standard deviations that are 2-3 times higher than output, the model uniformly 
implies that output, imports, and exports have standard deviations that are almost identical. These 
implications invalidate the positive effects above.
A key parameter in relation to the movements in relative prices (see Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland (1992b,c)) is the elasticity of substitution, p. This parameter has been shown to have 
important effects upon the comovements between e.g. net-exports and the terms of trade and 
may therefore also be perceived to be important for the international comovements that are 
addressed in the current paper. In order to investigate this issue, columns B1 and B2 of the table 
reports the results of using two extreme values of this parameter, 0.5 (Bl) and 3 (B2) and both 
experiments use the technology shock process of column B. While the parameter do affect the
22 Because of the general substitution framework there is a tendency for foreign investment to increase when domestic 
productivity is high. This, however, is limited by the desire to increase exports when relative prices are high, which 




























































































moments of the model, it does not seem to have big enough effects to circumvent the coun­
ter-factual implications listed above. The very inelastic case, forexample, do increase the vari­
ability of imports and the comovements of output and exports levels but on the other hand, 
investment levels still covary negatively across countries and the negative cross-country 
correlation of imports is worsened.
To investigate in more detail whether the exact values of the two additional parameters, 
the import share and the elasticity p, are important for the international comovements, the 
cross-country correlations of investment, exports, and imports levels were computed for a range 
of different values keeping the rest of the parameters constant and using the technology shock 
process of column B. The results are illustrated in figure 1. The negative comovements of 
investment levels appear to be a very robust implication of the model that, at least given the 
other parameters of the model, not easily can be changed. Imports levels also seem robustly to 
be negatively related unless the import share of output is quite low (below 11-12% which 
corresponds only to the U.S. case). Exports levels have a greater tendency to become positively 
correlated since this occurs both for a low import share and/or for a low elasticity.
Summing up, even though the product-specialization model is able to account for aspects 
of the data, such as imports being more procyclical than exports and net-exports being coun­
ter-cyclical, the model is in a number of ways not consistent with the data and it is therefore 
questionable whether one can claim much success in its’ positive elements.
4 Some Further Experiments
In this section I will judge whether some basic changes in the standard models can ward off the 
counter-factual elements of the theory. The two first experiments are concerned with trying to 
take account of country-size.
4.1 Country Size in the Two-Country Model
As discussed in section 3.1, country-size can relatively easy be incorporated into the two-country 
model by changing the parameter II which enters into both the resource constraints and the 
objective function of the planner. Analyzing the effects of country-size in this way has been 
done by e.g. Baxter and Crucini (1993), Ravn (1992) and Stockman and Tesar (1990). This 
procedure emphasize that big countries have larger effects upon world interest rates and 
accordingly country size may be important. Nevertheless, it may be argued that this is not the 
proper way of modelling country size. In particular, within a two-country set-up, the big country 
will always have very pronounced effects upon the world-economy, effects that seem unreas­
onable since it as well is only a part of the world-economy. What this set-up may be appropriate 
for is analyses of national business cycles in open economy frameworks. Irregardless of this, I 
first experiment with this set-up in order to evaluate whether incorporating country size change 
our understanding of international comovements.
In order to save space, I will concentrate upon the single-good model augmented with 
country size23. Table 4 lists the ten countries’ mean share of output in the period 1960-88. The 
U.S. is seen to be all-dominating with a share of total output within the ten countries only slightly 
smaller than 50 percent. The other countries are divided into medium sized economies (Japan,
23 In fact, the model of section 3.2 is also more difficult to handle in the two-country asymmetric country-size 
framework. TTie problem is associated with the import shares since there are cross-country consistency restrictions 
in equilibrium. As an example, assume that the big country accounts for 80% and has an import share of 15%, then 





























































































France, Germany, Italy, the U.K., and maybe Canada) which account for 7-13 percent of total 
activity, and small economies (Sweden, Switzerland, and Australia) each accounting for 1-2 
percent of output. Over time, most of these shares have remained relatively constant with some 
decreases in the shares of especially the U.S and the U.K. and with an upward trend in Japan’s 
share.
My experiments will relate to two situations. The first is a large country (the U.S) against 
a medium sized country choosing the weight so that Uj = 5/6 and n 2 -  1/6. The next experiment 
is a small country vs. the big economy, setting the weights equal to fU -  95% and n 2 = 5%.
The results of the simulations are given in part III of table 6. The headings A-C refer to 
the same parameterizations of the technology shocks as in part I; the indices 2 and 3 denote the 
two cases of country sizes and "big" and "small" refer to the moments of the big and small 
economies of the model. The message from the simulations are that international comovements 
are left almost unaltered by the country sizes - neither the cross-country correlations of output, 
consumption nor investment levels change by much. Elements of national business cycles do, 
however, change. In particular, the big country starts behaving as a closed economy and the 
small country becomes very dependent upon the world economy. The most important effects 
are the following. First, consumption and investment become more (less) variable relative to 
output in the big (small) economy whereas net-exports and output become more (less) variable 
in the small (economy). In fact, the variabilities of net-exports increase to numbers comparable 
with the those in the data. On the other hand, the model also predicts very procyclical net-exports 
in small countries - a counterfactual implication when contrasted with the data. Furthermore, 
the contemporaneous correlation between consumption and output and investment and output 
decreases (increases) as the country becomes smaller (bigger)24.
These effects follows naturally from the set-up of the asymmetric two-country model. 
What happens is that the big economy become less able to smooth its’ consumption stream using 
output of the small economy and this makes consumption more sensitive to domestic income. 
Furthermore, resources can be transferred at a cheap cost to the small economy and, in fact, 
consumption in the small country become more sensitive to foreign income than domestic 
income. It also becomes easier to transfer output to investment in the small country but since 
output of this country adds only little to world output, investment in the end becomes smoother 
in the small country and more variable in the big country.
Another implication of the model is that the savings-investment correlation should be larger 
in bigger economies. This, in fact, follows from a relation like the Fisher separation. In the big 
economy there is a direct relation between the returns to capital, which determines investments, 
and the world interest rate, which determines savings. This is due to the capital stock of the big 
economy dominating the world capital stock. Savings in a small economy, as measured here, 
become very sensitive to foreign income through the effects on consumption, whereas investment 
still depends on domestic factors. No such clear-cut pattern is found in the data albeit from the 
fact that the savings-investment correlation is largest in the U.S. - the second and third largest 
correlations relate to Australia and France. Accordingly, one may feel tempted to restate the 
Feldstein-Horioka (1980) savings-investment puzzle in terms of country-size.
For reasons which should be clear from the discussion, one is led to conclude that the 
two-country model with asymmetric country sizes does not seem to make theory much nearer 
to the data.
“ None of these relations to country size seem evident in the data. In fact, and oppostiely to the model’s prediction, 
the variability of output is largest in the biggest economy (the U.S.) and the relative variability of consumption 
smallest in the biggest economy. Only with respect to the comovements of investment with domestic output do the 




























































































4.2 A Three-Country Model
As discussed above, a two-country model do not seem to be the appropriate tool for analyzing 
comovements between single economies - after all, any country is only a part of the world 
economy. In the second column of table 5 ,1 have computed the mean shares of world output of 
the ten countries and it is noticed that the U.S. share shrinks from 47% to 27% percent and the 
second largest economy (Japan) from 13 to 7.5 percent. The essence of this observation is that 
all economies are subject to changes in the state of the world economy. An important consequence 
of this is that shocks in the world economy, that to some degree, at least, are exogenous to the 
domestic economy, constitute as common shocks to individual economies though this, of course, 
may not be completely right in reality due to differences in trade patterns, degree of openness, 
shares of non-traded goods etc.
The question is how one would model the nature of this common dependence upon the 
world economy. One way to do this would be to assume that the world real interest rate is 
exogenous, an assumption used by Marinan and Van Wincoop (1993). Here I will follow another 
route of investigation and use a very simple modification of the framework in the previous 
sections. In particular, I will set up a three-country open-economy framework in which one of 
the countries denote the world-economy. The state of the "world-economy" in this set-up relates 
naturally to the concept of common dependence of individual economies on the world economy. 
To keep things simple, I will use the standard single-good framework even though the multiple 
traded goods model can be handled without the pitfalls that occur in an asymmetric two-country 
model .
The three-country model requires only a few modifications of the framework of section 
3.1. The two first are innocuous and relate to the world resource constraint and the planner’s 
objective function. These may now be rewritten as:
W -  2  II,U, (12)
i- l
i n M - C f X t - G j - o  (13)
i- l
where we can make the normalization that the shares sum to one. As before, the shares can be 
related to country size.
The last modification is in practice harder to handle. This modification refers to the 
technology-shock processes which we now will expand to a three-variate first-order autore­
gressive process25 6:
(14)
where Z ,- [ Z U Z% Z3J ’ and e, -  [eu e* e3J ’.
The problem associated with this is the measurement of world output and employment. In 
principle, one could construct measures for these series but in practise this is not possible both 
because of the availability of series on a quarterly basis but also because of differences in 
measurements of output and in particular of employment. The OECD do provide data for
25 As discussed above the two-country model with asymmetric country sizes imposes cross-country restrictions on 
import-shares since these have to add up in steady state. In the three-country model this is no longer the case on a 
country by country basis, but of course a similar constraint still relates on the overall three-country steady state.




























































































aggregate OECD series which in principle could be used apart from the fact that OECD account 
for only slightly more than 60% of world activity. Another more serious problem is that the 
OECD series are unreliable in the sense that they are constructed on the basis of annual data and 
subsequently compiled into quarterly series.
An alternative procedure, applied here, is to use the processes of the previous sections 
appropriately adjusted for the number of countries. I use the following three processes:
'0.835 0 0 ' 0.906 0.044 0.044 ’ 0.8 0.075 0.075\
A - 0 0.835 0 ,A 2 - 0.044 0.906 0.044 >A3- 0.075 0.8 0.075
0 0 0.835, ,0.044 0.044 0.906, ,0.075 0.075 0.8 ,
These parameterizations have the properties that they keep at least one of the eigenvalues 
of the corresponding two-country processes; forexample, while the transition matrix used in 
experiments B of table 6.1 have eigenvalues of 0.994 and 0.818 the matrix A2 have eigenvalues 
of 0.994, 0.862 and 0.862. In principle, there are many ways of transforming the bivariate 
transition matrices into three-variate processes none of which are unique.
Part IV of table 6 lists the results of simulations of the three-country model. Two alternative 
cases are analyzed. The first is a case with a big (FI, = 27%) and a medium sized (II = 5%) country 
facing the world economy. The share of the big country is set equal to U.S.’s mean share of 
world output as given in table 5 while the medium sized country’s share is close to that of the 
U.K., Germany, France and Japan. The other case is two small countries, each with a share of 
1 percent, facing the world economy, a case corresponding to Sweden, Australia, Switzerland 
or Canada. The number in the table lists in the moments of the two individual countries in each 
simulation.
The most interesting aspects of these simulations relate to the international perspective 
since the effects of country size on national business cycle characteristics are identical to those 
in the previous section. First, note that the near-perfect negative cross country correlations of 
net-exports are circumvented so that all models now imply positive comovements across 
countries in net-exports. This is a straightforward result of the common-shocks element of the 
model - a positive technology shock or a negative government spending shock in the world 
economy decreases simultaneously the balance of trade in the two individual economies.
On the other hand, the model is not very clear in the predictions concerning comovements 
of output levels; in fact, only with the technology shock process C is the output correlation 
substantial and positive but this is at the cost of either a very low, or even a negative, correlation 
between national savings and investments levels. Furthermore, all alternatives preserve the very 
high correlations between national consumption levels. The reason for this is, again, that the 
intratemporal substitution between leisure and consumption is not strong enough to reduce the 
risk sharing properties of the model with any substantial amount. Also the procyclical behaviour 
of net-exports remains since the basic mechanism of the two-country model is maintained in the 
three-country model.
It is also worth noticing that the international positive comovements of investment levels 
in the data is implied by both cases A and C. However, since all experiments imply very smooth 
investment levels one may suspect this to be caused by high adjustment-costs as in section 3.1. 
In fact, if one chooses the elasticity of the adjustment-costs so that the standard deviation is three 
times bigger than the standard deviation of output, the positive investment correlation is reduced 
and become insignificant.




























































































The last experiments concerns the role of government spending shocks in the model. As discussed 
in section 2, government spending in the data seems unrelated across countries and the correlation 
with domestic output is very small with the exception of Sweden. One possible role for gov­
ernment spending in the model is to limit the cross-country correlation of consumption levels27. 
Recall that in the simulations up to this point, the direct effect of government spending on private 
marginal utility has been assumed to be zero. When this parameter is non-zero there may be a 
scope for government spending to reduce this correlation just as Christiano and Eichenbaum 
(1992) finds that it has a role in reducing the correlation between hours-worked and productivity.
The first observation concerns the effect upon economic activity. This question may be 
analyzed by use of the coefficients of the linearized system. Inspecting these for the para- 
meterizations of the model of the previous sections it turns out that the effects of government 
spending are very small compared to those of technology shocks and smaller than in a closed 
economy framework. The latter observation is explained by the fact that government spending 
affects output through the reaction of labour supply following the change in the real interest rate 
brought about by the government spending shock. Since the real interest rate is determined in 
the world economy, the effects of government spending shocks are smaller in open-economy 
frameworks. As an example, in the symmetric two-country model, the effects of government 
spending shocks on domestic output are 30 times smaller than those of an equal sized innovation 
to technology. This ratio is decreases to 15 in the big country (when this accounts for 5/6 of 
world output) of section 4.1 but is as low as 90 for the corresponding small country.
The only set of variables for which government spending do seem to have a significant 
role in the models presented so far, is for the trade variables in the differentiated goods model 
of section 3.2. In this model the effect of a positive shock to government spending (with tech­
nology shock process A) is a decrease in domestic exports of 14% while a technology shock of 
equal size increases exports by only 4%. Imports, however are still dominated by technology 
shocks the effects of which are around 8 times bigger than the effects of government spending. 
Insofar as net-exports are concerned, a unit shock to government spending has an immediate 
effect of a 6.5% deterioration while the corresponding number for a technology shock is 29%. 
This indicates that a potential role for government spending in real business cycles is their effect 
on trade dynamics.
I will now explore whether government spending shocks can have a role in decreasing the 
cross-country correlation of consumption levels in the open-economy real business cycle 
framework. I will analyze the effects of two sets of parameters. The first parameter is government 
spendings’ impact on private marginal utility while the other concerns the variability of gov­
ernment spending relative to technology shocks. The cross-country correlation of consumption 
levels as functions of these two parameters is illustrated in figure 3. The indices A-C again denote 
the three different technology shock processes.
Increasing the parameter p has the effect of causing more "direct" crowding-out of private 
consumption expenditure since government spending becomes a better substitute for private 
spending. In principle this could reduce the risk-sharing property of the model substantially since 
our consumption measure relates solely to private consumption expenditure. Nevertheless, figure 
3 of the panel illustrates that the effects on the cross-country correlation of increases in this 
parameter are very minor. The reason for this results is that while increasing p leads to more 
crowding out, it also results in a smaller effect upon labour supply and the intratemporal sub­
stitution mechanism between consumption and leisure therefore becomes even smaller. Alto­
gether, the two opposing forces leaves the risk-sharing property almost unaltered.
27 This possibility has been explored by Bee (1992) in a two-country simulation framework. An empirical analysis 
of international risk sharing is provided by Canova and Ravn (1993) who do not find much evidence in favour of 




























































































The cross-country correlation of consumption as a function of the standard deviation of 
government spending relative to the standard deviation of technology shocks in the range of 5% 
to 1000% is illustrated in panel B (the parameter p is set to 0.5). This ratio is seen to be a much 
more important device in reducing the consumption correlation of the model. In fact, if the 
variability of government spending was a free parameter, one could generate a correlation of 
almost any given size. If one computes the relative variability of government spending shocks 
to technology shocks that would reduce the cross-country correlation to the highest number 
observed in the data (0.675 for U.K. vs. Japan) and use the technology shock process A (which 
implies the lowest correlation of the three cases) one ends up with a number around 2.7-2.75. 
This implies a standard deviation of government spending around 12% of its mean share which 
is way above that in the data. Furthermore, it also implies that the model implies a ratio of the 
standard deviation of government spending to the standard deviation of output of 1.6 which is 
around 50% higher than the maximum in the data (1.17 for the U.K.).
Summing up, the effects of government spending on economic activity and international 
risk sharing appear to be disappointing but a potentially interesting role to investigate in the 
future is the effect upon trade dynamics.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The question I have analyzed in this paper is whether standard international real business cycle 
models can account for the international comovements that we observe in the data. While 
economies of the real world do move together as measured by cross-country correlations of 
output, consumption, investment, imports and exports, some of these comovements can not easily 
be explained by standard theories. This observation, in my opinion, puts doubt upon the trans­
mission mechanisms and the structure of the current international real business cycle models. 
This result is of course not to be interpreted that these models can not be useful at all, rather it 
indicates that important research lies ahead.
One potential problem that needs to be addressed is the measurement of the stochastic 
processes of the economy. In particular, I experimented with three different parameterizations 
of the technology-shock processes, all of which seem reasonable but which imply very different 
dynamic behaviour of technology. Which of these that were used in the experiments affected 
the results in important ways thereby making it difficult to evaluate the model. There seems to 
be a necessity for future research on this subject.
There seems to several possibly awarding avenues for future research. One possibility 
would be to investigate the structure of the goods markets in more detail. The existence of 
non-traded goods posits one facet of the real world not incorporated in the models analyzed in 
the current paper. Ravn (1992) and Stockman and Tesar (1990) analyze models with non-traded 
goods and both finds that these can alter the predictions of the theory substantially. Nevertheless, 
a problem with these models is that they generally are hard to quantify because of the lack of 
data on a more disaggregate level.
Another interesting possibility would be to investigate the effects of imperfect labour, 
goods, or financial markets. The standard models typically assume that there exists a complete 
set of contingent markets so that countries can trade in contingent debt. While such markets to 
some degree do exist it seems, however, to be the case that most international asset trade take 
place in non-contingent debt, the effects of which are analyzed by Baxter (1992) and Baxter and 
Crucini (1991). Another assumption employed in the standard models is that goods markets are 
competitive, an assumption that, while being convenient, is probably quite unrealistic. Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1992) analyze the effects of imperfect competition on the goods markets in a 
closed-economy framework and find that the market-structure is important. Extending this to an 




























































































As a final interesting avenue for future research, a literature is developing around the effects 
of non-recursive structures associated with information and incentive problems as well as with 
investment decisions. Of particular interest to international aspects of business cycles is the 
observation that information and incentive problems may provide explanations for the lack of 
international risk sharing (see e.g. Atkeson (1991), Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and Marcet and 
Marimon (1992)). Analyzing the effects of such obstacles in fully-specified aggregate quanti­






























































































All data were compiled from the Datastream database and relate to quarterly seasonally adjusted 
data. The numbers in tables 1-2 were computed from detrended data using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(1980) filter choosing X to be 1,600. In order to make results comparable, the sample periods 
were uniformly chosen to be 1970.1-1992.2 (with the exception of Sweden where the last 
observation was 1989.1). All data-series are OECD data for output components and employment. 
Output relate to GDP in fixed prices except for the U.S. where it isGNP. Consumption is private 
consumers expenditure in fixed prices with only small differences in definitions. Government 
spending is government expenditure (Australia, Canada and the U.S.) or government con­
sumption (the rest) in fixed prices. Fixed investment is gross fixed capital formation and inventory 
investment is the change in stocks, both series in fixed prices. Imports and exports both relate 
to goods and services and are also in fixed prices. Net-exports is measured as exports less imports 
divided by output while savings are measured as output less consumption and government 
spending. Employment relate to total civilian employment (Australia and the U.S.), total 
employment (Canada, Japan, the U.K. and Germany), employment in industry (France and Italy), 
or employment in manufacturing (Switzerland).
2. Computation of Solow-residual processes.
Series for "raw" Solow residuals were computed by subtracting the labour-share times the log 
of the number of employed from the log of output. The labour share was set equal to 58%. I also 
experimented with a share of 64% but this makes little difference to the moments. To make the 
results comparable across countries, the time periods were equalized to 1970-1992.2.1 detrended 
the series with linear trends after normalizing the first observation in each series to 1.
Next, I estimated bivariate relationships of the form (7.1) with each country against the 
U.S. The numbers in table 4 have the U.S. listed as the first variable. From these estimations I 
computed "semi-symmetric" versions of the A-matrices. These "semi-symmetric" matrices were 
required to have identical diagonal elements and off-diagonal elements of identical absolute 
value but of possibly different sign. These matrices were computed by requiring the real and 
imaginary parts of the eigenvalues of the symmetric versions to be identical to the original 
transition matrices and by imposing an obvious sign convention. The "semi-symmetric" versions 
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Table 1. Cross country Correlations. I. Output levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA 0.309 0.382 0.579 0.528 0.629 0.614 0.592 0.625 -0.234
(0.080) (0.077) (0.073) (0.060) (0.059) (0.056) (0.064) (0.066) (0.081)
AUS 0.771 0.439 0.335 0.413 0.427 0.594 0.371 0.149
(0.045) (0.062) (0.058) (0.075) (0.081) (0.060) (0.078) (0.093)
CAN 0.451 0.413 0.413 0.645 0.726 0.392 0.167
(0.051) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.035) (0.079) (0.094)
ITA 0.370 0.735 0.404 0.383 0.560 0.194
(0.085) (0.056) (0.091) (0.082) (0.077) (0.123)










(0.085) (0.072) (0.072) (0.105)





II. Private total consumption levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA 0.177 0.372 0.388 0.471 0.291 0.505 0.599 0.351 0.251
(0.076) (0.083) (0.101) (0.075) (0.081) (0.076) (0.078) (0.097) (0.080)
AUS 0.327 0.271 0.151 -0.077 0.099 -0.029 -0.180 -0.117
(0.074) (0.095) (0.096) (0.105) (0.091) (0.081) (0.080) (0.105)
CAN 0.362 0.115 0.325 0.524 0.517 0.289 0.166
(0.067) (0.084) (0.065) (0.068) (0.056) (0.105) (0.115)
ITA 0.354 0.466 0.423 0.288 0.301 0.188
(0.076) (0.085) (0.063) (0.100) (0.089) (0.092)
JAP 0.376 0.675 0.401 0.227 -0.060
(0.096) (0.046) (0.074) (0.089) (0.097)
SWI 0.488 0.280 0.568 -0.246
(0.058) (0.086) (0.053) (0.097)






III. Government spending levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA -0.129 -0.107 0.430 0.186 0.038 0.159 -0.225 -0.072 0.161
(0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.088) (0.098) (0.097) (0.081) (0.094) (0.090)
AUS 0.101 -0.173 0.014 -0.122 0.085 0.197 0.173 0.158
(0.086) (0.093) (0.097) (0.102) (0.091) (0.093) (0.104) (0.079)
CAN -0.359 -0.100 -0.139 -0.128 0.044 -0.215 0.148
(0.084) (0.105) (0.090) (0.081) (0.083) (0.076) (0.092)
ITA 0.019 0.165 0.101 0.190 0.216 0.054
(0.078) (0.087) (0.101) (0.097) (0.082) (0.090)
JAP 0.114 0.190 -0.021 0.092 0.106
(0.078) (0.114) (0.091) (0.097) (0.093)
SWI 0.037 0.022 -0.142 0.140
(0.097) (0.083) (0.082) (0.089)

































































































IV. Fixed investment levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA 0.583 0.617 0.664 0.691 0.748 0.363 0.246 0.433 0.064
(0.059) (0.058) (0.046) (0.043) (0.037) (0.089) (0.087) (0.074) (0.090)
AUS 0.383 0.491 0.665 0.502 0.298 0.427 0.294 0.178
(0.068) (0.066) (0.052) (0.067) (0.080) (0.075) (0.092) (0.088)
CAN 0.53? 0.421 0.458 0.250 0.080 0.059 0.275
(0.058) (0.059) (0.047) (0.113) (0.087) (0.077) (0.100)
ITA 0.498 0.668 0.298 0.270 0.356 0.205
(0.061) (0.053) (0.080) (0.078) (0.083) (0.103)
JAP 0.650 0.446 0.523 0.535 -0.006
(0.045) (0.071) (0.061) (0.066) (0.094)
SWI 0.249 0.375 0.395 -0.013
(0.071) (0.073) (0.062) (0.091)






V. Inventory investment levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA 0.272 0.090 0.480 0.295 0.522 0.360 -0.130 0.177 0.064
(0.099) (0.121) (0.101) (0.081) (0.057) (0.088) (0.089) (0.100) (0.104)
AUS 0.451 0.353 0.302 0.322 0.206 0.317 0.216 0.207
(0.092) (0.082) (0.072) (0.081) (0.103) (0.086) (0.105) (0.096)
CAN 0.281 0.221 0.124 0.146 0.443 0.398 0.158
(0.096) (0.080) (0.100) (0.095) (0.093) (0.072) (0.090)
ITA 0.497 0.301 0.345 0.101 0.429 0.413
(0.064) (0.102) (0.096) (0.115) (0.083) (0.113)
JAP 0.175 0.452 0.036 0.163 0.092
(0.082) (0.057) (0.087) (0.076) (0.091)
SWI 0.184 -0.098 0.287 0.187
(0.086) (0.083) (0.069) (0.096)






VI. Total investment levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA 0.409 0.353 0.568 0.511 0.674 0.399 0.153 0.411 0.004
(0.071) (0.091) (0.080) (0.054) (0.049) (0.078) (0.114) (0.088) (0.111)
AUS 0.561 0.521 0.577 0.391 0.472 0.457 0.277 -0.084
CAN
(0.061) (0.076) (0.052) (0.066)
0.462
(0.079) (0.081) (0.089) (0.119)
0.462 0.431 0.189 0.279 0.269 0.283
(0.067) (0.058) (0.056) (0.089) (0.070) (0.082) (0.085)
ITA 0.341 0.588 0.339 0.130 0.429 0.390
(0.092) (0.072) (0.084) (0.101) (0.107) (0.104)
JAP 0.605 0.473 0.467 0.548 -0.068
(0.047) (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.103)
SWI 0.219 0.264 0.377 0.063
(0.073) (0.093) (0.083) (0.103)




































































































AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA -0.141 0.529 0.377 0.532 0.637 0.364 0.407 0.473 0.470
(0.130) (0.062) (0.063) (0.080) (0.052) (0.101) (0.077) (0.069) (0.078)
AUS 0.120 0.050 -0.042 -0.154 0.244 -0.320 -0.125 0.003
(0.102) (0.096) (0.097) (0.100) (0.087) (0.120) (0.127) (0.091)
CAN 0.306 0.006 0.561 0.268 0.382 0.099 0.548
(0.102) (0.086) (0.075) (0.087) (0.072) (0.095) (0.070)
ITA 0.164 0.372 0.336 0.175 0.137 0.232
(0.090) (0.066) (0.082) (0.118) (0.079) (0.098)
JAP 0.401 0.279 0.181 0.459 -0.122
(0.080) (0.097) (0.078) (0.074) (0.102)
SWI 0.450 0.441 0.391 0.193
(0.072) (0.086) (0.075) (0.124)
UK 0.217 0.254 0.325
(0.096) (0.097) (0.111)




V ili. Imports Levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE


















































































IX. Net Exports Levels
AUS CAN ITA JAP SWI UK US WG SWE
FRA -0.177 -0.066 0.359 0.386 0.382 0.097 -0.191 0.198 0.222
AUS
(0.081) (0.083) (0.097) (0.075) (0.069) (0.097) (0.094) (0.077) (0.099)
0.350 -0.019 0.189 -0.365 0.303 -0.362 -0.492 -0.201
CAN
(0.077) (0.084) (0.081) (0.084) (0.083) (0.064) (0.061) (0.075)
0.067 0.110 0.122 -0.013 -0.595 -0.020 0.296
ITA
(0.104) (0.089) (0.086) (0.073) (0.068) (0.083) (0.086)
0.224 0.252 0.289 -0.220 -0.057 0.226
JAP
(0.086) (0.091) (0.084) (0.096) (0.101) (0.084)
0.573 0.512 -0.279 0.174 -0.087
SWI
(0.067) (0.075) (0.078) (0.119) (0.111)
0.345 -0.077 0.531 -0.152
UK




































































































































































































Y C G FI II/Y TI EX IM NX/Y
France 0.929 0.874 0.704 3.051 0.665 5.098 2.592 4.205 0.756
(0.065) (0.088) (0.064) (0.120) (0.055) (0.255) (0.161) (0.243) (0.049)
Austr. 1.170 0.784 1.299 4.368 0.921 5.987 3.141 6.048 1.466
(0.087) (0.055) (0.122) (0.354) (0.075) (0.363) (0.312) (0.877) (0.130)
Canada 1.445 0.889 0.762 3.061 0.672 4.558 2.812 3.212 0.907
(0.094) (0.034) (0.073) (0.232) (0.050) (0.237) (0.193) (0.143) (0.060)
Italy 1.482 0.762 0.349 1.919 0.910 3.840 2.302 2.627 0.787
(0.128) (0.047) (0.039) (0.093) (0.079) (0.110) (0.231) (0.151) (0.061)
Japan 1.085 1.049 0.543 2.645 0.420 3.058 3.987 5.109 0.733
(0.097) (0.068) (0.157) (0.126) (0.039) (0.134) (0.322) (0.449) (0.053)
Switz. 1.501 0.681 0.505 2.312 1.053 4.265 1.611 2.448 1.103
(0.132) (0.037) (0.063) (0.193) (0.102) (0.214) (0.115) (0.160) (0.063)
U.K. 1.518 1.170 0.566 2.503 0.763 4.401 1.770 2.450 0.954
(0.114) (0.057) (0.080) (0.237) (0.056) (0.299) (0.217) (0.225) (0.073)
U.S. 1.715 0.768 0.563 3.300 0.482 4.472 2.545 2.789 0.523
(0.116) (0.034) (0.056) (0.086) (0.043) (0.181) (0.259) (0.184) (0.029)
Germ. 1.372 0.941 0.884 2.623 0.796 3.858 2.368 1.876 0.887
(0.100) (0.059) (0.108) (0.135) (0.050) (0.188) (0.208) (0.122) (0.059)
Sweden 1.390 1.083 0.587 2.129 1.354 5.406 2.730 3.469 1.575
(0.086) (0.113) (0.065) (0.189) (0.119) (0.473) (0.299) (0.343) (0.139)
Abs. denotes absolute standard deviation. Relative to output denotes the standard deviation of the variable divided by the 
standard deviation of output.
B. Comovements
Contemporaneous Correlation with Domestic Output
Country c G FI II/Y Tl EX IM NX/Y S,I
France 0.637 0.250 0.824 0.587 0.838 0.592 0.779 -0.535 0.437
(0.053) (0.085) (0.031) (0.078) (0.035) (0.077) (0.042) (0.082) (0.068)
Austr. 0.532 0.046 0.695 0.487 0.765 0.051 0.328 -0.239 0.371
(0.061) (0.096) (0.036) (0.082) (0.032) (0.113) (0.076) (0.043) (0.039)
Canada 0.866 -0.149 0.641 0.600 0.797 0.654 0.781 -0.257 0.019
(0.032) (0.088) (0.037) (0.074) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.080) (0.091)
Italy 0.850 0.122 0.833 0.742 0.892 0.307 0.779 -0.533 0.126
(0.031) (0.094) (0.026) (0.054) (0.023) (0.089) (0.048) (0.072) (0.097)
Japan 0.786 0.058 0.877 0.301 0.841 0.032 0.538 -0.458 0.241
(0.039) (0.088) (0.020) (0.116) (0.026) (0.063) (0.050) (0.072) (0.127)
Switz. 0.775 0.272 0.846 0.616 0.871 0.660 0.814 -0.446 0.378
(0.022) (0.073) (0.022) (0.062) (0.019) (0.059) (0.021) (0.050) (0.069)
U.K. 0.858 -0.070 0.719 0.516 0.767 0.437 0.609 -0.374 0.086
(0.038) (0.097) (0.036) (0.073) (0.031) (0.072) (0.064) (0.081) (0.082)
U.S. 0.880 -0.009 0.940 0.564 0.920 0.348 0.746 -0.404 0.677
(0.019) (0.098) (0.012) (0.070) (0.013) (0.070) (0.039) (0.069) (0.051)
Germ. 0.662 0.090 0.797 0.427 0.789 0.464 0.692 -0.090 0.078
(0.048) (0.087) (0.037) (0.080) (0.047) (0.066) (0.057) (0.090) (0.107)
Sweden 0.147 0.373 0.327 0.666 0.630 0.336 0.343 -0.019 -0.262
(0.103) (0.080) (0.096) (0.068) (0.055) (0.101) (0.084) (0.104) (0.083)




























































































Table 3. Shares of Output Components
Country c G T1 FI II X M NX
France 59.2 18.5 23.8 22.9 0.91 21.1 22.6 -1.49
(1.13) (0.53) (2.54) (1.98) (0.86) (2.99) (2.70) (1.41)
Austral. 59.0 17.7 25.0 24.6 0.44 15.8 16.3 -0.52
(1.25) (1.23) (2.74) (2.31) (1.09) (2.36) (3.49) (2.49)
Canada 58.9 24.1 16.7 16.2 0.53 21.9 21.0 0.94
(1.12) (1.30) (2.03) (2.13) (0.97) (4.59) (5.60) (1.82)
Italy 61.9 16.5 24.4 23.0 1.35 19.7 22.5 -2.71
(2.02) (0.48) (2.58) (2.23) (1.10) (2.33) (2.45) (1.66)
Japan 60.3 9.85 31.3 30.3 0.98 12.4 13.9 -1.42
(1.84) (0.91) (2.62) (2.31) (0.78) (3.74) (2-05) (2.89)
Switz. 62.3 13.3 26.9 25.5 1.41 36.1 38.6 -2.47
(1.60) (0.83) (3.37) (2.56) (1.65) (4.72) (6.64) (2.60)
U.K. 60.9 21.3 18.1 17.6 0.47 24.0 24.2 -0.25
(2.37) (1.16) (1.81) (1.38) (0.97) (4.51) (4.71) (2.10)
U.S. 63.6 20.8 15.9 15.3 0.56 6.77 7.74 -0.98
(2.60) (2.43) (1.28) (0.96) (0.60) (1.86) (2.26) (1.12)
Germany 56.1 19.5 23.4 22.7 0.69 27.0 26.0 0.99
(2.18) (0.78) (3.02) (1.12) (1.12) (7.62) (6.74) (1.81)
Sweden 51.8 28.0 20.9 20.7 0.22 30.6 31.4 -0.81
(2.02) (1.47) (2.87) (1.62) (1.76) (3.62) (2.17) (3.15)
Numbers are computed from raw-series defined in the appendix. The numbers in paranthese are standard errors of the 




























































































Table 4. Estimates of Solow Residual Processes
A. Bivariate Autoregressions with the U.S and country X































































































( 0.830 -  0.042) 







































Note: Estimations were performed using least-squares. Numbers in the column "residual moments" denote: residual 
standard deviations in the diagonal, residual correlations in the off-diagonal. Numbers in parantheses are standard errors. 
Numbers are computed from bivariate vector-autoregressions with no deterministic terms included. The estimation 




























































































Table 5. Relative country sizes, means of 1960-1988
Country Share of 10 
country output







































































































Parameter Values for simulations:
Parameter values common to all experiments unless otherwise stated:
Labour Share of Income =58%,
Relative Rate of Risk Aversion, o=2,
Steady state no. of Hours Worked = 20%, 
Depreciation rate of Capital =2.5% per quarter,
Real Interest Rate per quarter =1.625% per quarter, 
Growth Rate =0.4% per quarter,
Discount factor {3* =0.988,
Steady-state government share of output =20%, 
Proportional tax rate =30%,
Steady-state consumption share =59.3% 
Government spending effect on private utility, p.=0, 
standard deviation of government spending =0.004, 
Persistence of government spending =0.95,
Standard deviation of technology shocks = 0.00852.
Experiments with standard single-good two-country model
Experiment A:
Steady-state Tobin’s Q =1 
Persistence of technology shock =0.835, 
Spillover of technology shock p^. =0.0, 
Correlation of innovations cor(Z ,Z’) =0.25, 
Adjustment-cost elasticity ^  =0.075,
Experiment B:
Steady-state Tobin’s Q =1 
Persistence of technology shock p ^  =0.906, 
Spillover of technology shock p^. =0.088, 
Correlation of innovations cor(Z,Z’) =0.258, 
Adjustment-cost elasticity =0.075,
Experiment C:
Steady-state Tobin’s Q =1 
Persistence of technology shock p ^  =0.8, 
Spillover of technology shock p^. =0.15, 
Correlation of innovations cor(Z ,Z’) =0.5, 
Adjustment-cost elasticity % =0.075,
Experiment D:
Steady-state Tobin’s Q =1 
Persistence of technology shock p ^  =0.79, 
Spillover of technology shock p^. =0.2, 
Correlation of innovations cor(Z ,Z’) =0.5, 
Adjustment-cost elasticity ^  =0.075,
Experiment A l:
As A but 1̂ , =0.0575
Experiment B l:
As B but 1* =0.03125
Experiment C l: Experiment D1:
As C but ^  =0.01875 As D but % = 0.01
Experiments with product-differentiation model
Import Share =22%
(Oj -  0.8474 and oo2 -  0.3664
Indices A-C refer to the same technology shock processes as above.
Experiments with two-country assymmetric country-size model.
Indices A-C refer to the same technology shock processes as in standard two-country model. 
Indices 2 refer to experiments where -  1/6 and II2 -  5/6.
Indices 3 refer to experiments where EIX -  5% and n 2 -  95%
Experiments with three-country model.
Experiment A:
Persistence of technology shock p ^  =0.835,
Spillover of technology shock p^. =0.0,
Correlation of innovations cor(Z ,Z’) =0.25,
Experiment B:
Persistence of technology shock p ^  =0.906, 
Spillover of technology shock p^ . =0.044, 
Correlation of innovations cor(Z,Z’) =0.258,
Experiment C:
Persistence of technology shock p ^  =0.8, 
Spillover of technology shock p^. =0.05, 




























































































Table 6. Simulation Results
I. The Single-Good Two-Country Model
Moment
Experiment 
A  B C D A1 B1 C l D1
STD(y) 1.535 1.372 1.338 1.212 1.557 1.413 1.393 1.251
(0.187) (0.178) (0.147) (0.135) (0.191) (0.191) (0.158) (0.146)
AU(y) 0.640 0.645 0.617 0.588 0.611 0.674 0.632 0.611
(0.080) (0.074) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) (0.075) (0.078) (0.079)
STD(c)/STD(Y) 0.366 0.646 0.587 0.771 0.348 0.618 0.527 0.723
(0.037) (0.084) (0.053) (0.074) (0.035) (0.081) (0.047) (0.071)
STD(x)/STD('Y) 2.803 1.799 2.306 1.598 3.064 3.052 3.005 3.009
(0.448) (0.275) (0.226) (0.160) (0.502) (0.440) (0.386) (0.418)
STD(nx/y) 0.625 0.647 0.618 0.630 0.545 0.434 0.356 0.323
(0.079) (0.080) (0.058) (0.060) (0.077) (0.092) (0.048) (0.055)
COR(c,y) 0.796 0.696 0.844 0.809 0.800 0.697 0.850 0.813
(0.055) (0.073) (0.036) (0.043) (0.054) (0.077) (0.034) (0.043)
COR(x,y) 0.951 0.986 0.906 0.904 0.964 0.913 0.976 0.906
(0.016) (0.005) (0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.023) (0.007) (0.019)
COR(nx/y,y) 0.718 0.780 0.582 0.623 0.700 0.572 0.515 0.332
(0.085) (0.071) (0.107) (0.094) (0.089) (0.117) (0.142) (0.155)
COR(y,y*) -0.055 -0.255 0.281 0.175 -0.041 -0.267 0.312 0.181
(0.153) (0.145) (0.140) (0.145) (0.154) (0.147) (0.139) (0.146)
COR(c,c*) 0.914 0.966 0.977 0.984 0.906 0.963 0.973 0.982
(0.028) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.031) (0.013) (0.010) (0.006)
COR(x,x*) 0.482 -0.185 0.901 0.852 0.339 -0.682 0.371 -0.366
(0.119) (0.149) (0.031) (0.045) (0.135) (0.083) (0.133) (0.129)
COR(nx,nx*) -0.998 -0.998 -0.999 -0.999 -0.998 -0.997 -0.999 -0.999
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
COR(s/y,x/y) 0.795 0.792 0.505 0.061 0.864 0.867 0.899 0.862




























































































II. The Product-Specialization Two-Country Model
Experiment
Moment A B c B1 B2
STD(y) 1.527 1.288 1.369 1.162 1.381
(0.189) (0.173) (0.165) (0.151) (0.190)
AU(y) 0.648 0.672 0.594 0.667 0.683
(0.079) (0.074) (0.078) (0.074) (0.073)
STD(c)/STD(Y) 0.329 0.683 0.532 0.773 0.632
(0.022) (0.068) (0.035) (0.059) (0.072)
STD(x)/STD(Y) 4.543 4.287 4.298 4.106 4.780
(0.180) (0.288) (0.255) (0.273) (0.353)
STD(ex)/STD(y) 0.966 0.986 1.073 0.998 1.181
(0.139) (0.146) (0.132) (0.160) (0.157)
STD(im)/STD(y) 1.047 1.083 1.102 1.663 1.090
(0.045) (0.053) (0.045) (0.094) (0.111)
STD(nx/y) 0.397 0.409 0.387 0.514 0.558
(0.044) (0.047) (0.036) (0.058)
0.901
(0.071)
COR(c.y) 0.891 0.820 0.905 0.763
(0.026) (0.054) (0.020) (0.027) (0.067)
COR(x,y) 0.950 0.864 0.914 0.869 0.831
(0.013) (0.039) (0.020) (0.040) (0.044)
COR(ex.y) 0.475 0.240 0.479 0.214 0.136
(0.120) (0.144) (0.118) (0.150) (0.149)
Cor(im,y) 0.966 0.955 0.970 0.926 0.765
(0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.029) (0.080)
COR(nx/y,y) -0.462 -0.544 -0.423 -0.653 -0.361
(0.132) (0.116) (0.126) (0.099) (0.143)
COR(y,y*) 0.194 -0.089 0.442 0.114 -0.202
(0.148) (0.154) (0.120) (0.152) (0.152)
COR(c,c*) 0.599 0.874 0.921 0.787 0.912
(0.123) (0.044) (0.027) (0.068) (0.032)
COR(x,x*) -0.120 -0.781 -0.212 -0.709 -0.843
(0.144) (0.058) (0.137) (0.075) (0.043)
COR(ex,ex*) 0.300 -0.015 0.308 0.169 -0.399
(0.157) (0.170) (0.137) (0.152) (0.144)
COR(im,im*) 0.074 -0.232 0.176 -0.590 -0.343
(0.147) (0.142) (0.142) (0.102) (0.135)
COR(nx,nx*) -0.999 -0.999 -0.999 -0.999 -0.999
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COR(s/y,x/y) 0.952 0.924 0.952 0.952 0.885




























































































III. Two-Country Model with Assymetric Sizes
Experiment
A2 A2 B2 B2 C2 C2 A3 A3 B3 B3 C3 C3
Moment Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big Small Big
STD(y) 1.675 1.380 1.515 1.243 1.407 1.288 1.726 1.339 1.567 1.199 1.432 1.267
(0.021) (0.163) (0.197) (0.154) (0.154) (0.151) (0.213) (0.158) (0.204) (0.149) (0.157) (0.150)
AU(y) 0.644 0.625 0.653 0.659 0.605 0.632 0.646 0.623 0.652 0.660 0.601 0.637
(0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080) (0.078) (0.079) (0.076) (0.073) (0.080) (0.080)
s(cys(Y) 0.336 0.459 0.586 0.745 0.559 0.630 0.337 0.503 0.575 0.798 0.553 0.651
(0.053) (0.020) (0.095) (0.054) (0.065) (0.030) (0.057) (0.018) (0.097) (0.048) (0.069) (0.026)
S(x)/S(Y) 2.886 3.170 1.637 2.412 2.383 2.748 2.920 3.342 1.591 2.665 2.483 2.964
(0.423) (0.077) (0.247) (0.085) (0.141) (0.065) (0.409) (0.061) (0.232) (0.120) (0.110) (0.071)
S(nx/y) 1.042 0.209 1.078 0.216 1.030 0.206 1.188 0.063 1.230 0.065 1.175 0.062
(0.133) (0.026) (0.134) (0.027) (0.097) (0.020) (0.152) (0.008) (0.154) (0.008) (0.111) (0.006)
COR(c,y) 0.465 0.956 0.455 0.878 0.709 0.940 0.330 0.968 0.364 0.919 0.654 0.959
(0.117) (0.012) (0.111) (0.036) (0.063) (0.017) (0.132) (0.008) (0.122) (0.012) (0.074) (0.011)
COR(x,y) 0.879 0.987 0.926 0.975 0.656 0.993 0.847 0.992 0.878 0.960 0.542 0.990
(0.039) (0.004) (0.027) (0.008) (0.076) (0.002) (0.048) (0.003) (0.042) (0.012) (0.096) (0.003)
COR(nx/y,y) 0.769 0.632 0.823 0.721 0.633 0.541 0.784 0.603 0.835 0.695 0.650 0.519
(0.072) (0.099) (0.058) (0.078) (0.098) (0.091) (0.068) (0.105) (0.054) (0.083) (0.095) (0.095)
COR(y,y*) -0.036 - -0.240 - 0.286 - -0.023 - -0.227 - 0.291 -
(0.152) (0.143) (0.136) (0.151) (0.143) (0.134)
COR(c.c’) 0.932 - 0.969 - 0.978 - 0.944 - 0.972 - 0.979 -
(0.022) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007)
COR(x,x*) 0.488 - -0.118 - 0.921 - 0.496 - -0.062 - 0.934 -
(0.119) (0.162) (0.026) (0.118) (0.166) (0.021)
COR(nx,nx*) -0.998 - -0.998 - -0.999 - -0.998 - -0.998 - -0.999 -
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
COR(s/y,x/y) 0.517 0.969 0.052 0.980 -0.107 0.952 0.497 0.997 -0.281 0.998 -0.264 0.996
(0.129) (0.010) (0.165) (0.006) (0.136) (0.014) (0.146) (0.001) (0.142) (0.006) (0.131) (0.001)
IV. Three-Country Model
Experiment
n , - 5 % , n 2-27% n , - n 2- i %
A A B B C C A B C
Moment Small Big Small Big Small Big
STD(y) 1.681 1.579 1.620 1.508 1.465 1.381 1.711 1.656 1.482
(0.214) (0.207) (0.224) (0.217) (0.177) (0.174) (0.217) (0.228) (0.178)
AU(y) 0.627 0.662 0.663 0.667 0.611 0.610 0.626 0.663 0.609
(0.085) (0.091) (0.077) (0.084) (0.082) (0.086) (0.085) (0.077) (0.082)
S(c)/S(Y) 0.303 0.341 0.491 0.540 0.502 0.537 0.344 0.517 0.515
(0.052) (0.056) (0.087) (0.094) (0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.102) (0.076)
S(x)/S(Y) 2.261 2.489 1.880 2.066 2.002 2.230 2.248 1.842 2.150
(0.181) (0.186) (0.073) (0.113) (0.222) (0.222) (0.231) (0.119) (0.076)
S(nx/y) 1.051 0.867 0.975 0.804 1.004 0.828 1.216 1.127 1.167
(0.134) (0.114) (0.145) (0.120) (0.106) (0.090) (0.140) (0.155) (0.112)
COR(c.y) 0.457 0.606 0.396 0.521 0.668 0.737 0.293 0.281 0.598
(0.139) (0.112) (0.159) (0.134) (0.095) (0.071) (0.155) (0.166) (0.106)
COR(x,y) 0.885 0.907 0.960 0.955 0.755 0.823 0.831 0.926 0.627
(0.035) (0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.071) (0.049) (0.049) (0.025) (0.095)
COR(nx/y,y) 0.808 0.749 0.855 0.798 0.711 0.640 0.779 0.826 0.682
(0.061) (0.083) (0.050) (0.073) (0.081) (0.105) (0.074) (0.007) (0.091)
COR(y,y*) 0.091 - -0.029 - 0.316 - 0.161 0.068 0.352
(0.191) (0.205) (0.158) (0.189) (0.204) (0.153)





0.411 - -0.272 - - 0.398 -0.311 0.812
(0.143) (0.182) (0.063) (0.146) (0.177) (0.059)
COR(nx,nx*) 0.168 - 0.164 - 0.185 - 0.466 0.462 0.482
(0.184) (0.197) (0.153) (0.153) (0.165) (0.125)
COR(s/y,x/y) 0.533 0.622 0.733 0.743 0.051 0.259 0.360 0.534 -0.133





































































































































































































T e chno logy  Shock Process B




































































































Figure 3. International Comovements
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